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The county court decision in Hall & Preddy v Bull[2011] EW Misc 2 (CC) provides a further exampleof judicial consideration of the interplay of religion
and sexual orientation discrimination, following such cases
as McFarlane v Relate Avon [2010] EWCA Civ 880 and Ladele
v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357 (which
dealt respectively with religious objections to providing sex
therapy and civil partnership ceremonies to homosexuals).
The judgments in the latter cases together with such
examples as Chaplin v Royal Devon & Exeter Hospital NHS
Foundation Trust [2010] ET 1702886/2009 and Eweida v
British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 80 (which both held that
prohibitions regarding wearing crucifixes were not
discriminatory), and the furore over the threat to Catholic
adoption agencies during the passage of the Equality Act
2006 (with many subsequently closing), caused leading
clerics to criticise an imbalance in discrimination law and
opine that the religious rights of the Christian community
are being treated with disrespect (see, eg Daily Telegraph
Letters, March 28, 2010; Montgomery, J W, “Religious
‘irrationality’ and civil liberties”, (2010) 82 Amicus Curiae,
12).
THE CASE
Hall & Preddy v Bull is a rare discrimination case involving
the provision of services and shows that an Englishman and
Englishwoman’s home is not necessarily their castle. Mr
and Mrs Bull had for many years run a private hotel near St
Ives in Cornwall. They are devout Christians and had
sought to run their hotel on Christian principles, with texts
on some of the walls and the statement on their online
booking form that “Here at Chymorvah we have few rules,
but please note, that out of a deep regard for marriage we
prefer to let double accommodation to heterosexual
married couples only – thank you”.
Mr Hall and Mr Preddy are civil partners, who lived in
Bristol. They wanted to go on a short break, with their pet
dog, to Cornwall in September 2008 and Mr Preddy made
a telephone booking for two nights in a double room at the
Chymorvah Private Hotel, having seen that it was a dog-
friendly establishment. As the booking was by telephone,
they did not see the restriction on who could book double
rooms and Mrs Bull, who took the booking, did not,
contrary to her usual practice because she was feeling
unwell, let them know of the restriction. The first Mssrs
Hall and Preddy knew of it was when they turned up at the
hotel. Their protestation that they were civil partners did
not help them, and the refusal to let them have a double
room, while not done in a demeaning manner according to
Mr Preddy, took place in the public reception area in the
presence of other guests.
One wonders as to the content of the discussion at this
point. Has society’s quest to “pigeon hole” its members
led to a situation where anyone who is not overtly
heterosexual must be subjected to questioning as to their
sexual orientation? Would Mrs Bull have questioned two
females in the same way – perhaps, because of her religious
conviction, she would have felt compelled to do so. But
what of a situation where two guests who are in a same sex
relationship arrived but having read the notice on the
webpage page, decided to ask for a double room with twin
beds so as to save any embarrassment – would these have
been questioned? The evidence as to this during the
hearing was unclear, but the judge, although initially
uncertain, was satisfied with the amended defence that
such rooms would be let if available (although noting that
if an unmarried couple – heterosexual or homosexual –
wished to embark on a “sexually fulfilling weekend”, the
hotel policy “allows them so to do albeit in the confines of
a smaller bed” (at para [34])).
Having gone on to find a different hotel, and had their
deposit refunded, Messrs Hall and Preddy sought a
declaration and damages under the then extant Equality Act
(Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 (SO Regs 2007).
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THE LAW (AT THE TIME)
Regulation 4 of the SO Regulations 2007 held that it was
unlawful, when providing goods, facilities or services to the
public, to discriminate against a person by, among other
things, refusing to provide those services or by providing
those services on different terms (see now s 29 Equality
Act 2010). This was not at issue in this case which was
argued solely on whether the Bulls’ action constituted
direct or indirect discrimination (and whether such a
construction was compatible with the European
Convention on Human Rights).
Regulation 3(1) of the SO Regulations 2007 held that a
person (“A”) discriminates against another(“B”) if, on
grounds of the sexual orientation of B or any other person
except A, A treats B less favourably than he treats or would
treat others (in cases where there is no material difference
in the relevant circumstances). The argument for the
defence in the present case was that the discrimination was
not on grounds of sexual orientation but had “everything to
do with ‘sex.’” Indeed, in 1996 the hotel had appeared in
newspaper stories because the Bulls refused double rooms
to unmarried heterosexual couples; and the twin-bedded
rooms were available to people regardless of their marital
status or sexual orientation. However, Judge Rutherford
disagreed with that analysis and considered that the Bulls
were discriminating on the basis of marital status. Pointing
to Regulation 3(4) of the SO Regulations 2007, which
specify that when making the comparison the fact that one
person is a civil partner while the other is married is not to
be treated as a material difference, he held that the only
conclusion which he could draw was that the refusal to
allow them to occupy the double room was because of their
sexual orientation. To put it another way, not that he used
such language, “but for” the claimants’ sexual orientation –
if they were heterosexual and thus married (any differences
between marriage and civil partnership not being material
for the purposes of the Regulationss) – they would not have
been less favourably treated.
In case he was in error, Judge Rutherford then went on
to consider indirect discrimination. The defendants had
accepted that the restriction on the occupation of double
rooms constituted a “provision, criterion or practice”
which was applied to the claimants and equally to persons
not of their sexual orientation (reg 3(3)(a)). They
contested, however, that the restriction placed persons of
the claimants’ sexual orientation at a disadvantage
compared to some or all others (where there is no material
difference in the relevant circumstances) and further that,
if it did, that they could not reasonably justify the
restriction by reference to matters other than B’s sexual
orientation (reg 3(3)(b) & (d)). Judge Rutherford,
however, held that it was clear that homosexuals as a group
were disadvantaged by the practice and that to allow the
justification would create a class of persons whose views
rendered them exempt from the discrimination legislation
and that such a defence would be too wide.
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
Article 9(1) of the European Convention on Human
Rights establishes a general right to freedom of “thought,
conscience and religion” which cannot be restricted by the
state; however Article 9(2) establishes that the right to
‘manifest’ one’s religion or belief in ‘worship, teaching,
practice and observance’ may be restricted. Article 9 can be
invoked alongside other Convention rights and thus, for
example, Article 10 can be considered if there are
restrictions placed on religious expression and Article 8 may
be relevant if any restriction interferes with the individual’s
private life. If the issue is in connection to the manifestation
of religion, the court is likely to focus on Article 9 as it was
in the case before us. Judge Rurtherford queried whether
the running of the hotel along Christian principles could be
described as manifesting one’s religion but came to the
conclusion that it could. However, the Christian religion
could be regarded as a forward thinking and tolerant faith
and does it therefore require that marital status can only be
achieved via a heterosexual marriage contract? (This is
something which is due to come under much scrutiny in the
next few years). Does the manifestation of the religion
require this observance? In Eweida v British Airways plc [2010]
EWCA Civ 80, for example, it was successfully argued that
the wearing of a crucifix was not indirect discrimination
because, inter alia, the wearing of a crucifix was not an
essential element of the Christian faith.
Irrespective of these questions as to Article 9(1), Judge
Rutherford held that such manifestation was in any case
subject to Article 9(2) and the SO Regulations 2007 were
both a necessary and proportionate intervention by the
state to protect the rights of others. By contrast, he did not
believe that the Bull’s Article 8 rights to respect for their
private and family life were infringed as the regulations did
not affect the private part of the hotel where they lived
(their privacy in the guest areas inevitably being affected by
their choice to run part of their home as an hotel) but if he
were wrong then, again, the right could properly be limited
as the regulations could be deemed both necessary to
protect the convention rights of the claimants and to do so
proportionately.
TEMPORA MUTANTUR…?
As Judge Rutherford points out, social attitudes have
changed in recent decades and it was not so very long ago
that the genuinely held beliefs of the defendants would
have been accepted as normal by society. Some
establishments may have turned a blind eye to unmarried
couples sharing a room, but it would not then have been a
widespread practice. Such was also the era of signs outside
boarding houses stating “no blacks, no dogs, no Irish.”
Since those days we have had a raft of equality legislation
alongside changes in social attitudes.
However, even before the advent of equality legislation,
innkeepers were under a duty not to refuse guests if4
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deemed to be “travellers” rather than lodgers or boarders.
This common law duty had been in existence for around
500 years and the relevant definition of an inn or hotel can
now be found in section 1(1) of the Hotel Proprietors Act
1956: an establishment held out by the proprietor as
offering food, drink and, if so required, sleeping
accommodation, without special contract, to any traveller
presenting himself who appears able and willing to pay a
reasonable sum for the services and facilities provided and
who is in a fit state to be received. Thus when, in
Constantine v Imperial London Hotels Ltd [1944] 1 KB 693,
Mr Constantine, an afro-Caribbean British subject and
man of high character, was turned away from the Imperial
hotel despite having booked a room and paid the deposit,
the hotel company was liable, albeit only in nominal
damages. However, if there had been a special contract –
such as is the case with boarding houses, lodgings and
guesthouses – then there would have been no duty. The
discrimination legislation expressly included boarding
houses within its remit (eg s 20(2)(b) Race Relations Act
1976, reg 4(2)(b) SO Regs 2007) but allowed a limited
exception for small communal accommodation (eg s 22
RRA 1976, reg 6(2) SO Regs 2007).
THE EQUALITY ACT 2010
Hall & Preddy v Bull and all the earlier cases took place
under the original discrimination legislation, as will the
appeal of the case due later this year. The new, unifying,
Equality Act 2010 replicates much of the former
provisions, with the definitions of direct and indirect
discrimination appearing in sections 13(1) and 19, the
statement regarding the lack of materiality of the difference
between marriage and civil partnership in section 23(3)
and the prohibition of discrimination in providing services
in section 29 (although the list of activities is no longer
included) and the communal accommodation exception in
Schedule 5. Within these provisions there has been very
little change to the law.
However, if a similar scenario to Hall & Preddy v Bull
occurred today the claimants could potentially take
advantage of a significant change. Under section 45(1) of
the Equality Act 2006, a person (“A”) discriminated against
another (“B”) if on grounds of the religion or belief of B or
of any other person except A (whether or not it is also A’s
religion or belief) A treated B less favourably than he treated
or would have treated others, whereas the unified direct
discrimination provision in the Equality Act 2010 (defined
in s 13(1)) refers to less favourable treatment because of a
protected characteristic. There is in the new Act no
limitation with regard to the protected characteristic of
religion preventing the religion in question from being that
of the discriminator. Accordingly, rather than it being a
question of the interplay of sexual orientation and religion,
and the possible imbalance therein decried by leading
clerics among others, the claim could now appear to take
place solely based on the protected characteristic of religion
as the less favourable treatment would be because of the
views of the defendants.
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